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INTRODUCTION: LEGAL FORM AND CULTURAL SYMBOL 
Music, copyright, and information and communications studies 
 
 
Writers in information and communication studies often assume the stability of 
objects under investigation: network nodes, databases, information. Legal writers in 
the intellectual property tradition often assume that cultural artefacts exist as objects 
prior to being governed by copyright law. Both assumptions are fallacious. This 
introduction conceptualises the relationship of legal form and cultural symbol. 
Starting from an understanding of copyright law as part of systems of production (in 
the sense of Peterson 1976), it is argued that copyright law constructs the artefacts it 
seeks to regulate as objects that can be bought and sold. In doing so, the legal and 
aesthetic logic of cultural symbols may clash, as in the case of digital music (the 
central focus of this special issue).  
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This special issue grew out of a seminar on intellectual property and the organization 
of cultural production that formed part of a seminar series on the cultural industries 
funded between 2003 and 2006 by the UK research councils AHRC and ESRC.1 
Broadly, the idea was to place intellectual property laws, and in particular copyright 
law, into a ‘production of culture’ perspective. The production of culture literature as 
developed by American sociologists during the 1970s (and first consolidated in a 
volume edited by Richard Peterson in 1976) is a loose family of empirically minded 
approaches that aim to trace how the symbolic elements of culture are shaped by their 
systems of production (usually understood widely to include technology, 
organizational structure, legal regulation).2 
 
The production of culture perspective allows for a structural rather than a genius, 
aesthetical, ideological, cultural or social explanation of cultural transformation, while 
avoiding the pessimism of cultural objects as commodities in Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s ‘culture industry’ analysis.3 Thus the emergence of the style of 
Impressionism may be due not to individual genius artists in a fracturing society but 
to a change in the structure of the Parisian art market, as bourgeois dealers and critics 
challenged the royal academy production system (White and White 1965). Similarly, 
the sudden emergence of Rock ‘n’ Roll between 1954 and 1956 may be explained 
from changes in studio technology and the regulation of the US radio spectrum that 
ended the monopolization of the means of production by major corporations (Peterson 
1990). 
 
The production of culture perspective can be fruitfully applied to copyright law. 
Griswold (1981) argues that the American copyright system of the nineteenth century 
(which only protected domestic authors while permitting the copying of foreign 
works) accounts for the emergence of the native ‘man against nature’ theme of the 
American novel, as novels of ‘domestic manners’ would be undercut by royalty free 
imports of that genre from Britain. This contrasts with a traditional literary 
explanation: differences in symbolic production were said to be the result of cultural 
differences – the new American novel reflecting the new American character. 
Griswold also claims that after the Copyright Act of 1909 which extended copyright 
to foreign authors, the divergence between American and European styles disappeared 
again, as American authors abandoned characteristic American themes.4 
 
In the context of the current digital shift in information and communication 
technologies (central to the concerns of the readership of this journal), and persistent 
                                                 
1 The series of 9 seminars was devised by Andy Pratt and Paul Jeffcutt. The seminar that gave rise to 
this special issue was hosted on 16 September 2005 by the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & 
Management (www.cippm.org.uk) at Bournemouth University. Early versions of all papers were 
presented at that event. 
2 Initially, the perspective is almost untheoretical in that there is no prior exclusion on what could be 
seen as part of production systems. Thus culture producing systems may even include markets 
(Peterson 1982) or space (Pratt 2004; 2007).  
3 According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the standardization of production in mass markets inevitably 
leads to a standardization of consumption (‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’, 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002 [1944]). 
4 The International Copyright Act (Chace Act, 1891) had already removed the overt discrimination 
against foreign authors, but important formal obstacles remained that made it difficult for foreign 
authors and publishers to obtain effective protection in the US until 1909 (such as requirements that 
books had to be registered and manufactured in the US). 
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demands to reform copyright laws, there are considerable benefits from understanding 
copyright law as a sub-system within a production of culture perspective. To give a 
simple example: 
 
If copyright law grants an exclusive right to make adaptations (as national copyright 
laws must under Article 12 of the Berne Convention which is integrated into the 
global free trading system under the 1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement), this will 
influence how artistic collaborations are structured, and what derivative works are 
being produced. When earlier creative materials are being re-used, permissions must 
be sought that can be refused, and creative discourse may have to be formalised at an 
early stage. Public Enemy’s Hank Shoklee and Chuck D have described such an effect 
following their seminal Hip Hop album ‘It Takes a Nation of Millions’ (1988), 
constructed as a ‘sonic wall’ of digital samples.5 Once copyright through case law (i.e. 
decisions by judges in court cases) started to conceive of samples of other sound 
recordings as infringements, Public Enemy had to change their style (see further 
discussion in the paper of Kawohl and Kretschmer elsewhere in this special issue). 
 
There are important insights to be gained here for legal scholars as well as for 
sociological and cultural researchers who engage with the production of culture 
perspective. For legal scholars, the perspective introduces an empirical dimension that 
opens the eyes for a fundamental evaluation: To what extent do developments in 
copyright law reflect or shape culture? Does copyright law follow its own logic? How 
should copyright law respond to the aesthetic practices it attempts to regulate? 
 
Secondly, researchers in culture and media studies have predominantly focussed on 
‘every day practices’, consumption, and in the digital context: piracy. Re-focussing on 
a production system that includes complex legal rules will move the debate forward. 
If rights are ‘the currency in which all sectors of the industry trade’ (Frith and 
Marshall 2004, 2), their role needs to be clearly articulated, not just referred to. This 
involves holding the tension between (i) music as an activity realised through 
complex communal mediations (Born, 2005), and (ii) the artist as an individualistic 
entrepreneur engaging in hard-nosed commercial relations. 
 
Thirdly, setting copyright within the framework of cultural production also is 
revealing for the discipline of information and communication studies. As the debate 
will show, copyright constructs the legal objects it purports to regulate, thus the 
relationship is not easily understood as causal. This moves the debate away from the 
assumption that the objects routinely deployed in analysis can be assumed to be 
stable. These points are extended in the next section.  
 
Music has become the locus for this interdisciplinary project because it was the first 
cultural industry to be exposed to the full forces of digitisation.  ‘Since music is easily 
personalised and transmitted, it also permeates many other services across cultural 
borders, anticipating social and economic trends’ (Kretschmer et al. 2001, 414). A 
decade after the first MP3 files began to circulate on the Internet, and a decade after 
copyright law first attempted to pre-empt the perceived dangers of digitisation 
                                                 
5 ‘How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hanks 
Shoklee’, Stay Free Magazine (K. McLeod 2001; 2002).  
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through the WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996, the time is right for another survey of 
this landscape.6 
 
The papers of this special issue approach the role of legal concepts in the explanation 
of creative production from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. As a legal scholar, 
Lionel Bently shows how UK copyright law requires the backward invention of the 
category ‘musical work’ into a creative practice that is oriented around performers 
and producers. Tuulikki Pietila reports a field study in South Africa that reveals the 
persistence of patronage structures in a changing technological and legal environment. 
Kawohl and Kretschmer map musicological ideas in a broad historical sweep on the 
underlying normative principles of copyright law. Cultural economist Peter Tschmuck 
contemplates the effects of a world without copyright on artist-publisher relations. 
Lastly, Klimis and Wallis place exclusive rights, back catalogues and P2P technology 
into the context of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. 
 
Common to all papers is an exploration of the law as an integral participant in the 
relationship of creators, producers and consumers, aiming to construct what can be 
bought and sold. Thus the debate progresses through detailed examinations of 
authorship, joint authorship, musical work, performance, ownership, contractual 
agreement, infringement, blanket licensing, merchandising – all in the recognisable 
empirical setting of the ‘celestial jukebox’ (Goldstein 2003 [1994]). 
 
While these questions are under-researched (at least outside law), of particular interest 
to readers of this journal will be aspects that cut across the whole domain of 
information. The next two sections of this introduction therefore provide a broader 
canvass by reviewing a ‘black box’ fallacy that may be common to science and 
technology studies, and in a different way to intellectual property law. The first 
fallacy assumes that information and network nodes already exist, rather than being 
constructed through usage. The second fallacy assumes that copyright law regulates 
pre-existing objects. We show from the example of music that copyright law 
constitutes the objects it governs.  
 
 
 
The object fallacy in information studies 
Within the pages of this journal the general, although not exclusive, focus of concern 
has been expressed via a particular conception of information, namely one that is 
‘black boxed’, or already formed (see MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). Thus, the 
major concern has been to address distributional matters: who is connected, or not; 
                                                 
6 An exclusive Internet right of ‘making available to the public’ was created (Article 8 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty; also Arts. 10 & 14 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty), backed up by a 
provision protecting the technology that might protect the new exclusive right: circumvention of copy-
protection measures (Article 11) and tampering with rights management information (Article 12, also 
Arts. 18 & 19 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty) would become illegal, regardless of 
purpose and function. There is also a general clause on the ‘enforcement of rights’ which must be such 
as to ‘constitute a deterrent to further infringement’ (Art. 14; also Art. 23 WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty). The US and Europe have used these provisions to introduce draconian criminal 
sanction against infringements targeting not only commercial competitors but consumers. Digital 
copyright under this conception may be defined as the combination of (i) exclusive rights, (ii) 
technological locks and (iii) consumer sanctions (Kretschmer 2003). 
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who has access, or does not; who has the appropriate social skills, or not; who has the 
economic power, or not. Additionally, there is concern with various forms of 
surveillance commonly placed in the context of debates about the public sphere and 
liberty (Raab and Mason, 2002). These issues have been given momentum by the 
expansion of the technologies of surveillance and the possibility of cross-referencing 
digital information from multiple databases. Despite the critical questions of use and 
distribution that these studies pose, it is as if we have accepted the taxonomies and 
classifications of data collection agencies; once again, the ‘content’ is black boxed. 
 
Running in parallel with these debates are those concerning technology and society. 
The central conceptual problem, the degree of autonomy one from the other, has 
shaped many debates. The most common versions explore some degree of the 
autonomy of technology and society via path-dependency or institutionalisation which 
shape long term transformations. An interesting intervention, and disruption, to these 
debates has come from the world of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Bijker 
and Law, 1992; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). The work of Callon, Woolgar and 
Latour (see Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Law, 1991; Woolgar, 1988) has been 
emblematic of a shift toward a co-constructivist agenda. Implicit in this work is a 
fulsome retort to the ‘network’ theories of Castells (1996).  Network theories are 
configured through an articulation of nodes and flows; critically nodes are constructed 
a priori. Actor Network theorists have (literally) opened up the ‘box’ debate about 
what objects are, what relation they have to society. Particularly influential has been 
writing on the users of technologies; the central point being to disrupt determination 
or voluntarism (on either side) and argue instead for co-constitution and openness. 
The boundaries of objects are constituted through usage and incorporation; they never 
just ‘are’ but they are in constant struggle to ‘fix’ the boundaries and meanings 
(Latour, 1988, 1999).  
 
So much is familiar to readers of this journal, however, the debate about the stability 
of objects in relation to Science and Technology Studies has only been taken up 
partially; there are plenty of debates about identity, but fewer about things. The 
radical intent of Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) is to unite the sociology of humans 
and non-humans (Latour, 1999). Looked at from this perspective the domain of 
intellectual property rights is a rich seam to mine. If one is concerned with what 
objects are, then recourse to the law seems to be one route way; however, and we 
would argue that this is an oversight of many of those in the sociology and 
communications studies community who point to the role of regulation or legal 
constraint, the law itself is a social process and it does not either have access to a 
privileged definition of things.  
 
 
The musical object fallacy in copyright law 
Law does not merely govern, it may constitute the objects it governs. This may 
involve the re-definition of a new technology so that it falls under an existing 
regulatory regime. For example, data transmission using telegraph technology was 
conceptualised as letters that should fall under the Postmaster General’s monopoly 
(UK Telegraph Act 1869). More radically, the objects of regulation might not exist 
without the governing regime: Under the system of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Number (ICANN), assigned unique identifiers constitute the 
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Internet. Thus regulation may evolve simultaneously, and at times at variance with the 
technologies and cultural symbols it seeks to turn into objects. 
 
Our central issue is how the relationship between legal forms and cultural symbols 
should be conceptualised in the context of copyright law. During the last decade, a 
new orthodoxy has taken shape that explains the rise of author rights at the end of the 
eighteenth century from the emerging romantic notion of genius (Woodmansee 1984; 
Woodmansee and Jaszi’s 1994; Boyle 1996).  Key historical citations of the ‘romantic 
author hypothesis’ include Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition 
(1759) calling on his fellow writers to depart from received models and become 
originals (§43: ‘An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises 
spontaneously from the vital root of Genius; it grows, it is not made’); Le Chapelier’s 
report introducing the 1791 French Revolutionary decree on the protection of 
dramatic works (Loi relatif aux spectacles): ‘The most sacred, the most legislate, the 
most unassailable … the most personal of properties, is a work which is the fruit of 
the imagination of a writer’7; and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1793 essay Proof of the 
Illegality of Reprinting (Beweis  der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks) in 
which he derives proprietary authorship from a concept of characteristic inalienable 
form (see Kawohl & Kretschmer in this special issue). According to the ‘romantic 
author hypothesis’, modern copyright law followed the invention of authorship. 
Aesthetics came first: The romantic ideology of singular expressions of a unique 
persona gave rise to authorial rights that could be conceived analogous to ‘real 
property’, abandoning an earlier conception of copyright as ‘a temporary, limited, 
utilitarian state grant’ (Boyle 1996, 56). 
 
In the context of music, Lydia Goehr has explicated the idealistic ontology of an 
abstract ‘musical-work concept’ as it formed at the end of the eighteenth century. A 
strict distinction between works (fixed with increasing precision), and performative 
interpretation began to regulate musical practice, and – says Goehr – set Western 
classical music on a path to The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (the title of her 
influential 1992 book). Reusing themes and passages in different works of music, 
even by the same composer, was increasingly censored as derivative and unworthy. 
Changing notes in performance, or improvising over the written indicators of a score 
became a violation of a permanent work of art. 
 
Goehr’s application of this ontological shift to copyright law is brief, and not very 
convincing. Surprisingly, she concentrates on ownership rights seen ‘as the product of 
a free person’s labour’, rather than on the appearance of the exclusive rights to public 
performance, and to make adaptations.8 In our context, the genealogy is revealing. In 
Goehr’s account, again, the work concept came first, legal expressions followed. 
                                                 
7 ‘La plus sacrée, la plus légitime, la plus inattaquable et, si je puis parler ainsi, la plus personelle de 
toutes les propriétés, est l’ouvrage, fruit de la pensée d’un ecrivain.’ The report then suggests that the 
character of the property changes once a work is published, advancing towards a rather unromantic 
notion of a ‘propriété du public’. This part of the report is much less known. Primary materials on the 
history of copyright are available on a new online database at the Centre for Intellectual Property and 
Information Law, Cambridge University (www.copyrighthistory.org).  
8 ‘When composers began to view their compositions as ends in themselves, they began to individuate 
them accordingly. When composers began to individuate works as embodied expressions and products 
of their activities, they were quickly persuaded that that fact generated a right of ownership of those 
works to themselves. Thus, as music came to be seen as the product of a free person’s labour, a change 
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Anne Barron, in an important revisionary contribution, has questioned the claim that 
the legal concept of the musical work is identical to the musicological category. She 
identifies a shift – ‘largely internal’ to legal doctrine – from ‘physicalism’ to 
‘formalism’. Cultural artefacts, says Barron, ‘present complex questions of attribution 
and identification’ (p. 42) that cannot be solved by analogy to physical tangible 
things. A formalist solution, first developed in the British ‘literary property debate’ of 
the eighteenth century would define property rights that will figure in market 
transactions, and necessarily extend ‘beyond the inscribed surface of a book’s pages’ 
(p. 43). Thus legal logic produced its own abstract work concept well before the 
idealist, romantic shift took place in aesthetic discourse.  
 
Sociologist Lee Marshall goes even further in his book on bootlegging (2005, 24): ‘As 
copyright law … acts as architect of modern proprietary authorship, it is fallacious to 
think of modern authorship as existing outside of copyright.’ We can no longer 
abstract authorship from the market relationships of production, distribution and 
consumption constituted by copyright law. 
 
Whichever explanation one might follow9, it is evident that by the end of the 
nineteenth century, an international architecture of copyright law was being erected 
that took its lead from the concept of an original, self-contained, abstract work: the 
modern ‘black box’ of copyright law. Under the Berne Convention originally signed 
in 188610, the full value of ‘every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain’ was awarded to the author (in practice mostly successors in title, i.e. 
corporations). Translations, reproductions, public performances and adaptations fall 
under exclusive owner control for a term derived from the life-time of the author, plus 
at least 50 years (in the US and the European Union where post mortem auctoris 
terms of 70 years are now provided, this can easily amount to a copyright duration of 
120 years).11 Exceptions to exclusive rights are only permitted ‘in certain special 
                                                                                                                                            
was deemed necessary in ownership rights.’ (Goehr 1992, 218) For further discussion, see Kawohl and 
Kretschmer’s paper below. 
9 Other explanations of copyright law might adopt a Marxist conception of law as the representation of 
the conditions of production in capitalism (Edelman, 1977 [1973]), an orthodox economic explanation 
as an efficient regulatory response for the allocation of resources (Landes & Posner 2003), an political 
economy explanation of regulatory capture (Kay 1993; Lessig 2004; May 2000) or an understanding of 
copyright law as part of social processes in networks of collaboration and competition (Toynbee, 
2001). The production of culture perspective does not seek any explanation of the production system 
itself, and may thus be compatible with any of the above approaches. 
10 The latest version of the Berne Convention is the Paris Act 1971, as amended in 1979. The US 
acceded to Berne only in 1989. In 1994, the Berne Convention was integrated into the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that is all 151 members of 
the World Trade Organization (as of 27 July 2007) are now bound by it. The exception is Art. 6bis, the 
unwaivable droit moral that was excluded at the behest of US negotiators following lobbying pressure 
from Hollywood. Art 6bis specifically protects the author’s right to claim authorship (paternity right), 
and to object to changes that would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation (integrity right), even 
after the transfer of all exclusive copyrights. Thus the droit moral somewhat limits the freedom of 
corporations to exploit works without recourse to the author. 
11 The European Copyright term was harmonized to life plus 70 years with the 1993 Council Directive 
(93/98/EEC). The US Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act (1998) extended the term by 20 years to 
life plus 70 years, or 95 years for ‘works for hire’ (works created under employment by corporations, 
for example sound recordings). In Europe, sound recordings, broadcasts and performances are only 
protected as neighbouring or ‘related rights’, that is for a term of 50 years from the end of year of the 
recording or broadcast.  
 8 
cases’, provided that ‘such reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation 
of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author’, the notorious three-step-test.12  
 
User interests or freedoms are not independently conceptualized in Berne, nor is there 
any recognition that all creative activity draws on other cultural production. Berne 
works are self-contained and original, not derived from a common cultural domain.13  
 
Following Berne, a purely technological reflex appeared to drive the evolution of 
copyright law. Since the full value of copyright unquestionably should go to the 
author or owner, the advent of gramophone, radio, television, audio-tapes, video-
tapes, photocopying, satellite, cable, computer and Internet technologies necessitated 
a string of copyright amendments, usually extending the scope of protection to a 
technologically unforeseen activity.14 
 
The contributors to this special issue offer different responses to this ‘reverse 
determinism’ under which new technologies and cultural practices are pressed into a 
conceptual box that was constructed 200 years ago. While Bently [at 4] is sanguine 
about the possibility of a closer  ‘correspondence between legal ways of 
understanding culture and dominant aesthetic understandings’, Pietila traces persisting 
social structures despite upheavals in technology and the law. Kawohl and 
Kretschmer call for a re-assessment of the traditional copyright approach to 
infringement. Tschmuck diagnoses an inherent trend in copyright law to industrial 
concentration. Klimis and Wallis deplore a narrowing of entrepreneurial options. All 
suggest that the schism between contemporary cultural production and copyright 
norms is likely to persist for some time. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This special issue is a cross-disciplinary effort that seeks to re-engage in questions 
about the production on culture. We argue that sociologists and communications 
scholars have overlooked recent scholarship in critical socio-legal and socio-
economic studies on copyright. We argue that such insights should cause us to take a 
far more measured look at ‘digitisation’. We argue that too often researchers and 
commentators have taken copyright for granted and simply sought to re-articulate new 
technologies and social relations to it. Our argument is that these very objects, music, 
performance, art are in flux. As such there are opportunities to re-define relationships 
of production and consumption. The legal establishment is happy to ‘update’ or re-
inscribe old norms into new production forms; our argument is that just as readers of 
this journal would normally be wary of technological determinism, so they ought to 
be wary of ‘legal determinism’. 
                                                 
12 Art. 9(2), introduced at the Stockholm revision conference in 1967. Note that under Berne, the three-
step-test does only apply to the reproduction right. However, Art. 13 of the TRIPS Agreement (1994) 
and Art. 10 of the WIPO Copyright (Internet) Treaty (1996) make the test applicable to all copyright 
limitations and exceptions. 
13 See further discussion in Kretschmer (2005). 
14 Only where exclusive protection was deemed to be unenforceable, as for music performances and 
broadcasting, photocopying by libraries, cable re-transmission or in private copying, was a mechanism 
of licensing via collecting societies adopted in many countries. The principle of collective licensing is 
still ‘pay-for-play’ but at a rate that is not negotiated individually. In effect, it substitutes owner 
exclusivity with a right of remuneration. 
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In this paper, we have initially followed the strategy developed by ‘the production of 
culture’ literature that has been relatively neglected in mainstream cultural studies and 
communications studies. For us, this approach has a very useful function; it ‘brackets 
out’ cultural judgement. Of course, Peterson and his followers have been criticised for 
taking such a nominalist and empiricist approach; we do have some sympathies with 
such criticisms. However, for us applying Peterson’s perspective to the legal aspects 
of music production opens up a critical space within which we may examine the 
construction of copyright norms. We have suggested that one possible strategy might 
be to develop a constructivist argument in relation to the notion of copyright, this 
points us in the direction of questions about the very ontology of copyright and the 
objects that it defines. What is needed is nothing less than a reconstruction of 
authorship in which the logic of law can be seen to leave its own imprint. 
 
We hope that by presenting a range of papers that begin to question the relationship 
between copyright and cultural production (not necessarily following our 
provocation) that it will have two outcomes for a multi-disciplinary audience. First, 
that scholars of sociology and communication studies might take a more critical 
stance on the status of the law and regulation in the constitution of objects of 
governance: be they the internet, telephony, stories, or music. They might look more 
closely at the co-constitution of cultural forms such as music less through the lens of 
macro-objects such as technology and society, and more through micro-hybrids; 
rather than the law being a ‘regulator’ in the background we might better see it as an 
integral participant.  
 
Secondly, we can perhaps view the current struggle in music production, distribution 
and use in such a manner. This is a struggle more about defining what is, or is not, an 
object, and who has rights over its use than one of a balance of public and private 
ownership. It is a debate that will inevitably spread across all media forms. Currently, 
many media forms are locked by being irreducibly linked to physical objects (such as 
books, newspapers or CDs), the movement of which can be traced. This is the control 
of copyright by default to physical objects. Once ‘released’ through the process of 
digitisation, a new process of ‘formalisation’ (in Barron’s sense) is either inevitable, 
or the market may have to retreat from the sphere of information. This special issue 
seeks to articulate the conditions for this choice. 
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